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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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V. 
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Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 42447 
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2014-2299 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Stephen Rozajewski asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015 Opinion No. 55 (Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2015) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirms the denial of his motion to 
suppress, is in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, as it 
misinterprets, and so, misapplies the rules from those prior decisions. 
On review, Mr. Rozajewski contends that, upon finding one of the officers 
mispresented facts to the magistrate while applying for a warrant to search 
Mr. Rozajewski's room, the district court failed to properly apply the two-prong test for 
dealing with those false statements. As a result, the district court erroneously denied 
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Mr. Rozajewski's motion to suppress the evidence found in his room, as proper 
application of the two-prong test reveals the search warrant for that search was 
irreparably tainted by the officer's misrepresentations of fact. Therefore, this Court 
should vacate the judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying Mr. Rozajewski's 
motion to suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Rozajewski was attending classes at Treasure Valley Community College 
and had just found a new place to live. (See Tr., p.79, Ls.9-11 (defense counsel noting 
that Mr. Rozajewski had been doing well in his classes); Tr., p.11, Ls.15-24 (Officer 
Larry Hemmert acknowledging that Mr. Rozajewski had moved into his new place two 
days before Officer Hemmert's visit to the house).) However, his new landlord, Shon 
Delisle, was having problems, which resulted in a visit from Mr. Delisle's probation 
officers to arrest Mr. Delisle for violating his probation. (See 1/28/14 Hemmert Report 
attached to Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.168.)1 Although Mr. 
Rozajewski was not on probation himself (see, e.g., Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.25, 
Ls.13-18), Mr. Delisle's probation violation would also impact Mr. Rozajewski because, 
in following up on that probation violation, one of the officers lied to get a warrant to 
search Mr. Rozajewski's room. (R., pp.80-81 (finding that, while applying for a warrant, 
the testifying officer made two false representations of fact with reckless disregard of 
the truth).) 
1 The police reports attached to the PSI appear to have been copied from other 
documents which had been paginated in the lower right corner. Those page numbers 
are included in references to those reports. 
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The probation officers requested the assistance of patrol officers to arrest 
Mr. Delisle. As a result, Officer Hemmert and another officer were sent to help the 
probation officers. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.168.) Shortly after 
arriving on scene, Officer Hemmert placed Mr. Delisle under arrest, and the other officer 
took Mr. Delisle to the Canyon County Jail. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, 
p.168.) There were three other people inside the house when Mr. Delisle was arrested: 
Mr. Delisle's girlfriend Karen Lechner (also appears in the record as "Leischner"), 
Mr. Rozajewski, and Mr. Rozajewski's friend, Lisa Lee. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report 
attached to PSI, p.168.) 
After Mr. Delisle had been taken away, the probation officers and Officer 
Hemmert searched the house. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.168.) 
However, they did not search Mr. Rozajewski's room because he was not on probation 
and he refused to consent to a search of his room. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) Officer 
Hemmert found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the living room, the kitchen, and the 
room Mr. Delisle shared with Ms. Lechner. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.4.) 
After completing that search, Officer Hemmert interviewed the three people still 
being detained at the house and, ultimately, issued summonses to all of them. (1/28/14 
Hemmert Report attached to PSI, pp.168-69.) During his interview, Mr. Rozajewski said 
none of the items Officer Hemmert had found in the common area were his. (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.12-16.) It was at that point that Officer Hemmert asked Mr. Rozajewski for his 
permission to search his room. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.169.) 
When Mr. Rozajewski did not give consent, Officer Hemmert called for additional 
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assistance so that he could request a search warrant for Mr. Rozajewski's room. 
/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.169.) 
Thus, an hour after Officer Hemmert arrived on scene, Officer Steve Fisher 
received the request for additional assistance. (1/28/14 Fisher Report attached to PSI, 
p.201.) When he got to the house, he found four other officers on scene. (1/28/14 
Fisher Report attached to PSI, p.201.) Officer Fisher was briefed on the situation and 
informed that Mr. Rozajewski's room had not been searched. (Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, 
L.6.) There was no indication that the other officers were concerned for their safety at 
that time. (See generally Tr.; Reports attached to PSI.) Nevertheless, Officer Fisher 
decided to perform a protective sweep of Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-14.) 
There is no indication in Officer Fisher's report as to what he saw or did not see while 
conducting that search.2 (See generally 1/28/14 Fisher Report attached to PSI, pp.201-
03.) 
After sweeping Mr. Rozajewski's room, Officer Fisher went to apply for a search 
warrant (1/28/14 Fisher Report attached to PSI, p.202.) Officer Hemmert stayed at the 
house, where Ms. Lee subsequently told him that she had left a pipe with 
methamphetamine in it in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.2.) Officer 
Hemmert relayed that statement to Officer Fisher. (Tr., p.16, L.19- p.17, L.13.) 
Officer Fisher subsequently gave testimony in support of his application for a 
warrant (See Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.)3 He testified that, "Upon entering 
2 As will be discussed infra, Officer Fisher gave more detailed information about his 
protective sweep at an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Rozajewski's subsequent motion to 
suppress. 
3 Mr. Rozajewski filed a motion for the district court to take judicial notice of the warrant 
application proceedings. (R, p.71.) Although the district court did not enter a formal 
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[the house], they [the other officers] found drug paraphernalia in plain view. Drug 
paraphernalia consisted of a marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a methamphetamine 
pipe. (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00.) He continued, "And Shon 
Diesel [sic] ultimately ended up going to jail. During the course of that search, they 
came in contact with a Steven Rozowski (sic, phonetic]. I have trouble pronouncing his 
last name. He just recently moved into the 2021 Washington residence, has a room in 
the southwest corner." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:00-2:22.) When asked 
if he had seen the drug paraphernalia the other officers found, Officer Fisher replied that 
he had and that "[i]t was in the front living area as soon as you walked in the front door." 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:32-2:46.) 
He also told the magistrate that he had conducted a protective sweep of 
Mr. Rozajewski's room: "When I got there, I asked immediately if a protective sweep 
had been done to the residence. They told me the only room that they didn't do a 
sweep on was Steven's room and I opened the door and did a protective sweep and 
just made for sure nobody was in there" (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
2:46-3:05.) He did not tell the magistrate what, if anything, he had seen during that 
protective sweep. (See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) He would 
order granting that motion (see generally R.), it did state that it had listened to the audio 
recording of the warrant application proceedings at the hearing on Mr. Rozajewski's 
motion to suppress. (Tr., p.5, Ls.11-13.) A CD with the audio of that hearing was 
included in the appellate record as an exhibit. (R., p.127.) 
Since the testimony at that hearing is the focus of Mr. Rozajewski's motion to 
suppress, references to that testimony will include the specific time (minutes:seconds) 
in the recording the statements were made. Where quotations from that hearing are 
necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate counsel's ability. 
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later testify the reason for not doing so was to not "muddy up the warrant" (Tr., p.22, 
13-14.) 
Officer Fisher admitted that the room had not been searched before he arrived 
because "Steven is not on probation and he would not consent to a search of his 
bedroom." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:10-3:19.) When asked to explain 
why he suspected there would be evidence of drug use in that room, Officer Fisher 
testified. 
A. Upon interviewing Lisa Lee, Shon Diesel's [sic] significant other, she 
says that there's meth inside the room with a methamphetamine pipe. 
Q. Did she say she'd seen that? 
A. Yes. 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:21-3:44.) 
Officer Fisher then proceeded to describe where the bedroom was located in the 
house. There was some confusion as to whether Mr. Rozajewski's room was in the 
southeast or southwest corner of the house. (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
3:47-4:15.) The warrant was ultimately amended by interlineation to indicate it was in 
the southwest corner. (See Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:47-6:18.) Officer 
Fisher was also asked to describe how to get to Mr. Rozajewski's room from the front 
door, and he responded: "You enter the residence, you go to the right into a little 
hallway and the bedroom door is right there on the right side." (Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 6: 17-6:34.) 
Officer Fisher's testimony concluded when he was asked to reiterate the reasons 
he believed that there was evidence to be found in Mr. Rozajewski's room. He 
responded: "Due to all the drugs found inside the residence in the common area and 
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also Lisa Lee's statements stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom. (Audio of 
Warrant Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) The magistrate followed up with a few 
questions about who lived in the house: 
Q. Does Lisa Lee live there? 
A Yes. 
Q. With Mr. Diesel [sic]? 
A Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rojowski [sic, phonetic] or -
A Yes. 
Q. -- whatever his name is. 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 6:58-7:05.) 
Based on Officer Fisher's oral affidavit, the magistrate issued a warrant to search 
Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Audio of Warrant Application hearing 7:05-8:38.) Upon 
executing that search warrant, officers found methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, 
and a marijuana cigarette. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.9, p.16, 
Ls.16-19.) They also found a gun under the bed. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.16, 
Ls.19-22.) As a result, Mr. Rozajewski was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance and unlawful possession of a firearm, along with a persistent violator 
enhancement.4 (R., pp.19-22.) 
Mr. Rozajewski filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found in his room 
because he asserted that Officer Fisher had made four material, false representations 
4 There were two other misdemeanor cases arising from this same incident that were 
addressed at the same time this case was addressed. (See, e.g., Tr., p.45, Ls.4-6; PSI, 
pp.19-20.) 
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(three statements and one omission) to the magistrate in his application for the 
search warrant. (R., pp.65-67.) Specifically, those false representations were: (1) that 
Ms. Lee was Mr. Delisle's girlfriend; (2) that Ms. Lee lived at the residence; (3) that 
Ms. Lee had seen methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room (rather than that she 
had left her methamphetamine in that room); and (4) that Officer Fisher had not testified 
that he did not see anything concerning during his protective sweep of Mr. Rozajewski's 
room. (Tr., p.7, Ls.15-21; see R., p.67.) 
Defense counsel questioned Officer Fisher on these various false 
representations. Officer Fisher testified that he had simply misspoken when he said 
Ms. Lee was in a relationship with Mr. Delisle.5 (Tr., p.28, Ls.8-9.) He explained that, 
based on what he saw at the house, he believed that Ms. Lee was in a relationship with 
Mr. Rozajewski, not Mr. Delisle, and concluded that, because Mr. Rozajewski and 
Ms. Lee were in a relationship, they were living together. (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-16.) However, 
he did not question anyone to verify or dispel those assumptions. (See Tr., p.24, 
L.24 - p.25, L.6.) Officer Fisher also testified that he did not recall Officer Hemmert 
telling him that Ms. Lee had said she left her methamphetamine in the room, although 
Officer Hemmert testified that he did remember relaying that statement to Officer Fisher. 
(Tr., p.25, L.18 - p.26, L.10 (Officer Fisher's testimony on this point); Tr., p.16, 
L.19 - p.17, L.13 (Officer Hemmert's testimony on this point).) Finally, Officer Fisher 
testified that he had seen what he thought was a butane torch and a pipe when he 
conducted the protective sweep. (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-6.) He explained that he did not tell 
5 This was the same explanation Officer Fisher gave for getting both Mr. Delisle's and 
Mr. Rozajewski's names wrong during the warrant application hearing. (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.10-16; Tr., p.28, Ls.10-15.) 
8 
magistrate about that because he thought it would "muddy up the warrant" 
, p.22, Ls.13-14.) 
The district court considered each of the false representations in turn. In regard 
to the first representation, the district court found that Officer Fisher did not act 
recklessly when he testified that Ms. Lee was in a relationship with Mr. Delisle; he had 
just misspoken. (R., p.80.) In regard to the fourth representation (the material 
omission), the district court found that the omission was not prejudicial because, had 
Officer Fisher disclosed what he had seen during the protective sweep, that information, 
by itself, would have supplied probable cause for the warrant. (R., p.81 ) 
However, as to the second representation, the district court found that Officer 
Fisher had made a false representation with a reckless disregard of the truth. 
Specifically, it found that Officer Fisher's testimony that Ms. Lee lived at the house 
arose from Officer Fisher's unjustified assumption of that fact. (R., p.80.) The 
assumption was unjustified because it was based only on the fact that Ms. Lee and 
Mr. Rozajewski were sitting together when Officer Fisher arrived at the scene and he 
made no attempt to confirm or dispel that assumption. (R., p.80.) Furthermore, on the 
third representation, Officer Fisher's testimony - that Ms. Lee had seen the drugs 
and/or drug paraphernalia in the room - conveyed an erroneous impression that was 
different than the statement she actually gave to Officer Hemmert and which had been 
relayed to Officer Fisher. (R., p.81.) Therefore, the district court found that testimony 
was also a false representation made in reckless disregard of the truth. (R., p.81.) 
The district court recognized that the next step of the relevant analysis was to set 
aside the false representations and determine if probable cause still existed without 
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them. (R., p.81.) However, the district court did not set aside the statement that 
Ms. lived at the house because it determined that it was not material, in that the 
finding of probable cause would not have been altered if it were set aside. (R., p.83.) 
Ultimately, the district court found that the remaining information "known to the 
magistrate was that officers found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a 
tin containing marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of 
the [sic] Delisle and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's 
room." (R., p.83.) Based on that conclusion, the district court determined, "after 
deleting the false statements and including exculpatory information about the location of 
the methamphetamine, the magistrate could still have concluded that there was a fair 
probability that evidence of a crime could have been found in the defendant's room. 
(R., pp.82.) Therefore, it denied Mr. Rozajewski's motion to suppress. (R., p.83.) 
Mr. Rozajewski subsequently entered a conditional plea reserving his right to 
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.97; Tr., p.48, L.23 - p.51, L.9.) He 
entered an Alford plea6 to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. (Tr., p.45, 
Ls.17-24.) The State agreed to dismiss all the remaining charges and enhancements 
related to this incident. (Tr., p.45, Ls.4-24; see also PSI, pp.19-20.) The district court 
imposed and executed a unified sentence of five years, with four years fixed, on 
Mr. Rozajewski. (R., p.101.) Mr. Rozajewski filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.115-18.) 
On appeal, Mr. Rozajewski argued that the district court had failed to properly set 
aside the false statements made by Officer Fisher. He also contended that, once those 
6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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false statements were properly set aside, the remaining information he actually and 
properly presented to the magistrate (namely, that drug paraphernalia had been found 
in the common area of the home) was insufficient to establish probable cause for 
the search warrant for Mr. Rozajewski's room. That was because the fact that there 
was paraphernalia in the common area did not create the requisite nexus to 
Mr. Rozajewski's room. 
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the district court's order denying 
Mr. Rozajewski's suppression motion. It did not resolve the question regarding the 
district court's obligations in regard to setting aside the false statements, but instead, 
resolved the case based on its determination that the illicit items found in the common 
area, by themselves, justified a search warrant for Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Opinion, 
pp.5-7.) Mr. Rozajewski filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the order denying 
Mr. Rozajewski's motion to suppress is in conflict with previous decisions of the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Rozajewski's motion to 
suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Order Denying Mr. Rozajewski's 
Motion To Suppress Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court 
A Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted 
only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. 
Rule 11 S(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition 
for review, including whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court. 
I.AR. 118(b)(2). Mr. Rozajewski contends that is the case here, and so, there are 
special and important reasons for review to be granted. Therefore, this Court should 
exercise its review authority in this case. 
B. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Fails To Appreciate The Underlying Nexus 
Requirement In Its Analysis Of Whether The Facts Remaining After The Officer's 
False Statements Are Removed Established Probable Cause To Support The 
Search Warrant In This Case 
The Court of Appeals' decision turns on its understanding of this Court's decision 
in State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 347 (2011 ). (Opinion, pp.5-7.) In Hansen, this 
Court affirmed the denial of the homeowner's challenge to a search warrant for his 
home because it determined that drug paraphernalia found in the bathroom his house, 
which the homeowner allowed another person living in an RV on his property to also 
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use, was sufficient to create probable cause for a warrant to search the remainder of the 
homeowner's house. Hansen, 151 Idaho at 347. The facts in this case are different 
from Hansen, in that Mr. Hansen was the owner of the home the police wanted to 
search, whereas Mr. Rozajewski only rented a room within the home. (See Opinion, 
p.6.) However, the Court of Appeals determined there was "no functional difference" 
between the two cases. (Opinion, p.6.) It believed that, "[w]ere we to hold otherwise, 
the result would be that a person who rents a room from a probationer, as in this case, 
is afforded greater protection than a homeowner who rents a room to a probationer, as 
in the case of Hansen." (Opinion, p.6.) That belief is unfounded and misunderstands 
the underlying analysis necessary to determine whether probable cause has been 
established. With a proper understanding of the underlying analysis, the rationale 
behind the Hansen decision is revealed to be inapplicable to Mr. Rozajewski's case. 
This Court discussed the underlying analysis for determining whether probable 
cause has been established in State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2004). Specifically, 
it explained the question of whether probable cause exists turns on whether the State 
has presented specific evidence which shows a nexus between three items: (1) the 
alleged criminal conduct; (2) the items the police intend to seize; and (3) the place to be 
searched. Id. This nexus "must be established by specific facts; an officer's general 
conclusions are not enough." Id. This means "there must be some facts, in addition to 
the finding of probable cause that the person has committed a crime, which would 
support a finding that there is a fair probability that the items sought are in the location 
which the officers seek to search," though magistrates may draw reasonable inferences 
from the evidence in this regard. State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 644 (Ct App. 1993). 
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It was this analysis, though not expressly articulated, which dictated the outcome 
Hansen.7 See Hansen, 151 Idaho at 346-47. In Hansen, this Court determined that 
the fact that officers found drugs in the bathroom of the defendant's home was sufficient 
to give rise to probable cause for a search warrant for the rest of the defendant's home. 
Id This was true even though the defendant allowed another person, who was living in 
a trailer in the back yard, to also use that bathroom. Id. at 346. Rather, the facts in that 
case showed, based on the paraphernalia found in the bathroom, officers were seeking 
to seize items related to drug use. See id. at 346-47. Thus, there was a nexus between 
the first two Yagerfactors (alleged criminal conduct and items to be seized). 
The other part of the nexus analysis, between the items to be seized and the 
place to be searched, turns on a determination of access and control to the place to be 
searched - would the person having control over the items in the common area also 
have access to and/or control over the other places the officers want a warrant to 
search. See, e.g., State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 838 (Ct App. 2008); 2 LaFave, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 3.7(d), at 387; see also Yager, 139 Idaho at 686 (noting that 
the place to be searched in that case was the bedroom over which the defendant had 
sole control). If there is such a connection, then there is likely probable cause to search 
7 There is no need for an opinion to recite every potentially-relevant legal principle; 
according to the doctrine of stare decisis, judges are presumed to act in accordance 
with prior decisions. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 
559 (1989) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)) ("The doctrine of 
stare decisis 'permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law 
rather than the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our 
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.'"); see also 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 913 (2011) (noting the presumption of 
regularity in court judgments). Thus, absent a clear indication the Hansen Court was 
breaking from prior decisions on the nexus requirement, it is presumed that the nexus 
requirement was incorporated in the Hansen decision. 
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the other place for similar items. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686; cf. Hansen, 151 Idaho at 
347. However, if there is not such a connection, there is no probable cause to search 
the other place. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686. 
This is where the distinction between a homeowner and a renter makes a 
difference. The homeowner usually has control over the whole house. See, e.g., 
Colbert v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. 2001) ("Like any homeowner, in the 
absence of an understanding to the contrary, the mother retained the right of entry to all 
areas of her house including the room Appellant occupied."). Therefore, the nexus 
between the homeowner and items in a common space, and thus, the nexus between 
similar items and the rest of the house, is present. See Hansen, 151 Idaho at 34 7 
(indicating that, based on the facts presented to the magistrate, the nexus is extended 
to the whole house). Thus, as a general rule, if there are items over which the 
homeowner has control in one part of his house, there is a factual nexus that he will 
have items in another area of the house. Compare, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 747 
F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) ("If the defendant uses the whole building as a single unit 
or is in control of the entire premises, the entire premises are suspect. There was every 
indication here that Roberts was using the garage and the house as a single unit. 
Therefore, the search of both was not overbroad .... ") 
Of course, facts are critical to this analysis. See, e.g., State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 
416, 422 (2014) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)) ("'[T]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,' and the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized a totality of the circumstances approach is 
necessary" to determine if there has been a violation of those protections). The point 
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being, as the facts in Hansen demonstrate, the illicit items in one part of Mr. Hansen's 
house combined with his ability to access and control other areas of his house can 
create the necessary nexus - that illicit items probably will be found in those other areas 
of his house under his control. See id. Under those facts, a search warrant for the rest 
of the house under the homeowner's control is appropriate. See id. 
On the other hand, a person renting a room inside a house, such as 
Mr. Rozajewski was doing, will usually only have exclusive control over the room he is 
renting, and, as a result, usually has an independent expectation of privacy in that room. 
See, e.g., Fancher, 145 Idaho at 838; United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Duran, 957 F.2s 499, 505 (7th Cir. 1992). That interest 
supersedes that of the homeowner such that the homeowner cannot authorize an 
intrusion of the renter's privacy. See, e.g., Fancher, 145 Idaho at 838. As the Fancher 
Court pointed out, absent evidence that the home owner "had access to Fancher's 
room, customarily entered the room when Fancher wasn't present, or kept personal 
belongings in Fancher's room, the State failed to meet its burden of establishing 
common authority" over the room, and so, the home owner did not have actual or 
apparent authority to consent to a search of the room. Id. at 838-39; cf United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, n.7 ('The authority which justifies the third-party consent does 
not rest upon the law of property ... but rests rather on mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes . . .") (internal 
citations omitted). 
As a result of this additional expectation of privacy, the situation with the renter is 
meaningfully different than the homeowner scenario considered in Hansen. (Compare 
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Opinion, p.6.) In the renter scenario, there simply is not the same extent of control and 
access which created the nexus in Hansen. Thus, additional analysis is necessary in 
the case of a renter that is less likely to be needed in the case of a homeowner. 
That conclusion is borne out in the overall Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As 
Professor LaFave explains, "the question was not whether there was probable cause to 
believe [the defendant] as an individual was involved in the previously observed use of 
marijuana, but rather, whether the room used by him was not a possible hiding place for 
the marijuana received by [the other occupant of the house]." 2 LaFave, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE§ 3.7(d), at 387. Thus, "'[a]s in cases where there is no link to any particular 
resident, there is still the opportunity of access by one tenant to each occupant's room 
and the appearance of collective arrangements. Concealment of evidence or frustration 
of purpose would result if a search warrant had to be artificially limited to an access 
extent less than that of the particular suspect."' Id. (quoting State v. Suits, 243 N.W.2d 
206 (Wisc. 1976)) (emphasis added) As such, the determination focuses on whether 
the subject known to have control over the items in question also has access to the 
other places the officers want to search. If he has access, there is likely probable cause 
to search those areas, but if he does not, there is likely not probable cause to search 
those areas. See id. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court summarized this legal principle best, 
explaining: 
Accordingly, we cannot infer that the facts relating to the presence of 
cultivated [marijuana] plants in the common yard indicate the existence of 
probable cause to search defendant's apartment, or one of the three other 
occupied apartments sharing the yard. Without any facts linking the 
defendant to the planters in the common yard or some showing of criminal 
activity within the apartment, there was no probable cause for the 
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issuance of the warrant to search defendant's apartment. Suspicions do 
not amount to probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
v. Robinette, 270 N.W.2d 573, 578 (S.D. 1978) (emphasis added). 
However, in this case, the State presented no evidence to the magistrate which 
would indicate that such a connection existed between the items found in the common 
area and Mr. Rozajewski's room. First, as in Fancher, there was no evidence that 
anyone else living at the house beside Mr. Rozajewski had access to his room, 
customarily entered it when he was gone, or kept personal belongings in the room. 
(See generally R., Tr.) In fact, the evidence presented to the magistrate demonstrates 
Mr. Rozajewski exercised his sole control over the room by prohibiting the officers from 
searching it while they searched the rest of the house pursuant to Mr. Delisle's 
probation waiver. (See Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:46-3:19.) Therefore, 
the evidence indicates that, of the residents of the house, Mr. Rozajewski, and 
Mr. Rozajewski alone, had access and control over the bedroom the police wanted to 
search 
Rather, there had to be some specific facts showing a connection between the 
items in the common area and Mr. Rozajewski or his room in order to establish probable 
cause that other such items might be in his room. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686; 
compare Robinette, 270 N.W. 2d at 578. However, there were no specific facts tending 
to connect Mr. Rozajewski or his room to the items in the common area. (See generally 
Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) The officer's general conclusion - that, because 
of the drugs in the common room, there may be drugs in Mr. Rozajewski's room - does 
not satisfy that requirement. Yager, 139 Idaho at 686 (explaining that "an officer's 
general conclusions are not enough," to establish the nexus). 
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Thus, reading Hansen in light of Yager, 8 there were specific facts presented in 
the officer's testimony showing that Mr. Hansen had some connection to the times in the 
bathroom, thereby creating the nexus between the illicit items and Mr. Hansen, and 
thus, the other areas of the house under his control. Therefore, a warrant to search 
those areas was appropriate. 
That does not mean Mr. Hansen had any less of an expectation of privacy than 
Mr. Rozajewski. (See Opinion, p.6.) They had the same expectation of privacy in the 
parts of the home they controlled. The difference is that the State presented specific 
evidence justifying an intrusion into Mr. Hansen's privacy by showing the nexus 
between the places in which Mr. Hansen had that expectation and the illicit evidence 
found in the common area, whereas, in Mr. Rozajewski's case, the officers did not 
truthfully present any such facts to the magistrate. That simply means that, unlike in 
Hansen, the State failed to carry its burden of proof in this case, once the officer's lies 
are properly removed from the calculus. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals misperceived and misapplied the relevant legal 
rules, which resulted in an opinion which is inconsistent with this Court's established 
precedent. As such, this Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
8 The nexus requirement was already well-established in Idaho law when the Hansen 
Opinion was delivered. See, e.g., State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2003); 
State v. Sorbet, 124 Idaho 275, 278 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing 2 Lafave, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE§ 3.7(d)). 
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II 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rozajewski's Motion To Suppress 
On review, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Rozajewski's motion 
to suppress. While the district court properly found that Officer Fisher lied to the 
magistrate, misrepresenting the facts with reckless disregard for the truth, it did not 
properly analyze the case under the second part of the Franks test. See Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1978). 
To establish probable cause for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, the 
State must present evidence showing a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93 (1993); 
State v. Harper, 152 Idaho 93, 98 (Ct. App. 2011 ). An inherent part of that rule is that 
the facts being relied on must be truthfully presented to the magistrate. Id.; see also 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165; State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41 (1979). "To have a 
warrant set aside on the ground that its issuance was based on a false representation of 
material fact, the defendant must establish that the false representation- (1) was made 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for truth; and (2) that the facts 
included or omitted were material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause." 
State v. Sorbet, 124 Idaho 275, 279 (Ct. App. 1993); see Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. The 
inclusion of false representations in the affidavit or testimony of the officer is material if, 
without those representations, probable cause would not have been found. Id. 
An omission is material if there is a "substantial probability" that, had the omitted 
information been presented, it would have altered the finding of probable cause. Id. 
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Thus, when the Franks test is properly applied, the officer's false statements 
should be removed entirely from the probable cause calculus and the warrant reviewed 
only in light of the remaining facts which were properly presented to the magistrate. 
Since those remaining facts fail to establish probable cause to search Mr. Rozajewski's 
room, the district court erred by denying the motion to suppress. 
Whether the misrepresentation of fact is material (i.e., whether there would still 
be probable cause if the false representations were set aside) is a question of law that 
this Court reviews de nova. State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47 (Ct. App. 1999). 
However, the determination of whether the erroneous statements were made 
intentionally or recklessly, as opposed to negligently or mistakenly, will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that such a determination is clearly erroneous. Id. 
The district court made several different errors in applying that rule to this case: 
(1) it failed to properly set aside all the false representations; (2) it improperly 
considered facts that were not presented to the magistrate in its evaluation of whether 
there was still probable cause after the false statements were set aside; and (3) it relied 
on a clearly erroneous factual finding about the evidence that had been presented to the 
magistrate in its evaluation of whether there was still probable cause after the false 
statements were set aside. For all those reasons, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying the motion to suppress the evidence found during the search 
based on the warrant which was obtained by making false representations to the 
magistrate. 
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A. The District Court Failed To Set Aside All Of Officer Fisher's False 
Representations From Its Consideration Of Whether There Was Probable Cause 
The district court found that two of Officer Fisher's representations were false 
and made with reckless disregard of the truth: (1) that Ms. Lee lived at the house; and 
(2) that Ms. Lee had seen methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (R., pp.80-81.) 
When the false representations in the warrant application process speak to the basis for 
the affiant's knowledge of the link between the suspect and the items being sought 
under the warrant, the affiant "'can manipulate the inference a magistrate will draw. To 
allow a magistrate to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause 
ho at 530" (quoting Stanert, 762 FState v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 530 (Ct. App. 
(quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 769 
F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
Therefore, when such a false representation is made, "we must exclude from our 
consideration the false or intentionally misleading statements to [the magistrate], 
and review the finding of probable cause upon the remaining evidence." Id. Since both 
of Officer Fisher's recklessly false representations speak to the link between 
Mr. Rozajewski and the items the officers wanted to seize from his room (Ms. Lee's 
methamphetamine), those false representations needed to be set aside in their entirety. 
However, the district court did not set aside the first false representation at all, and it did 
not fully set aside the second. (See R., p.83.) Therefore, its evaluation of whether 
there was still probable cause absent those false representations was erroneous. 
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1. The District Court Erred By Not Setting Aside Officer Fisher's False 
Representation That Ms. Lee Lived At The House 
Despite finding that Officer Fisher had falsely testified that Ms. Lee lived in the 
house with reckless regard for the truth (R., p.80), the district court decided that false 
representation "need not be omitted" based on the district court's determination that the 
false representation was not material. (R., p.83.) That is a clear misapplication of the 
rule set forth in Franks. 
Franks established a two-step test for determining whether an officer's 
false statements in procuring a warrant should be the basis for suppressing the 
evidence found as a result of that warrant. Franks, 438 U.S 156; see, e.g., United 
States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1445-46 (8th Cir. 1995). The first step is for the district 
court to determine whether an intentional or reckless false representation was made. 
Id. If so, then the district court is to set that false representation aside. Id. Only once 
that false representation is removed from consideration can the district court properly 
engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there was probable 
cause based only on the information properly presented to the magistrate. See Ozar, 
50 F.3d at 1445-46. As the Eighth Circuit aptly explained, if the district court skips the 
first step and does not set the false representations aside, but instead, jumps straight to 
the second step, it "frustrates appellate review" of the issue because the district court 
fails to engage in a meaningful or effective analysis of whether the error was harmless. 
Id. 
Basically, the district court that does not set the false representation aside fails to 
remove the error from the equation, and so, the answer it reaches is still tainted by 
erroneous information. See id. Such an answer is as unreliable as the magistrate's 
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original conclusion However, that is exactly what the district court did in this case, 
and thus, its conclusion regarding whether probable cause existed without the false 
representations is unreliable and should be disregarded. 
The whole point of the Franks analysis is to make sure that officers do not obtain 
warrants based on false information because if they do, they violate the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165; Lindner, 100 Idaho at 
41. As defense counsel pointed out, the false representation that Ms. Lee lived at 
the house was material because it enhanced the impact of her statement - it raised the 
inference that she knew Mr. Rozajewski had drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in his 
room because she lived there, and thus, had the opportunity to see what was in Mr. 
Rozajewski's room. (See Tr., p.34, Ls.12-21.) This is precisely the type of manipulation 
of inferences that had the Court of Appeals concerned in Chapple. Chapple, 124 Idaho 
at 530. As such, this false representation, which established the link between Mr. 
Rozajewski and the items being sought, needed to be set aside before a proper 
evaluation of the evidence could occur. Id. As a result, the district court erred by not 
setting aside Officer Fisher's false representation that Ms. Lee lived at the house before 
evaluating whether probable cause could be found on the information properly 
presented at the warrant application hearing. 
2. The District Court Erred By Not Fully Setting Aside Officer Fisher's False 
Representation About Ms. Lee's Statements Regarding The Evidence 
Purportedly In The Bedroom 
Based on the testimony given at the warrant application hearing, the warrant in 
this case was only issued based on two factual representations: "Due to all the drugs 
found inside the residence in the common area and also Lisa Lee's statements 
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stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom." (Audio of Warrant Application 
Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) The district court found, as a matter of fact, that one of those 
representations - that Ms. Lee had told officers that she had seen drugs in 
Mr. Rozajewski's room - was false and was made in reckless disregard of the truth. 
(R., p.80.) 
However, the district court did not set aside that false representation in its 
entirety; it still considered the fact that there was "methamphetamine in a backpack in 
[Mr. Rozajewski's) room." (R., p.83.) That decision was wrong for two reasons: 
(1) when the false representation in the warrant application goes to the officer's 
knowledge of how the suspect is connected to the criminal activity and/or the evidence 
being sought, the entire false representation needs to be set aside, see, e.g., Chapple, 
124 Idaho at 530; and (2) it is not proper for the district court to consider information that 
the officer could have, but did not actually, present to the magistrate judge, see, e.g., 
State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 11 (Ct. App. 1990). 
For either of those reasons, the fact that Ms. Lee had said there were drugs 
and/or drug paraphernalia in a backpack Mr. Rozajewski's room was erroneously 
considered by the district court. 
a. The Officer's False Representation About Ms. Lee's Statement 
Needed To Be Set Aside In Its Entirety 
In his testimony to the magistrate judge, Officer Fisher made two statements 
about what Ms. Lee had told him about the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia purportedly 
in Mr. Rozajewski's room: (1) "Upon interviewing Lisa Lee, Shon Diesel's [sic] 
significant other, she says there is meth inside the room with a methamphetamine pipe," 
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because "she'd seen that," (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:21-3:44); and, 
(2) "Due to . . Lisa Lee's statements stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom," 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54). The district court found, as a matter 
of fact, those were not true representations about the fact at issue. (R., p.81.) 
The reason those representations were false is that they asserted, or at least 
implied, that it was Mr. Rozajewski who owned the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in 
his room even though Ms. Lee actually told Officer Hemmert the drugs were hers. 
(Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.2.) This implicates yet another of the Chapple Court's concerns 
regarding untruthful applications for warrants: when the officer does not accurately 
recount the basis for his knowledge of the link between the suspect and the items to be 
seized, he '"can manipulate the inference a magistrate will draw. To allow a magistrate 
to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real 
meaning."' Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530 (quoting Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781). 
Similar to the representations Officer Fisher made in this case, the officer 
applying for the search warrant in Chapple attested that "Val Chapple is known to your 
affiant as an associate of Jill Olsen. In fact, your affiant has talked with Val Chapple 
about his associates and he confirmed his association with Jill Olsen." Id. at 530. As 
the Court of Appeals pointed out, this statement "suggests that Chapple confirmed 
directly to [the officer] that he was an associate of Olsen." Id. However, in response to 
Mr. Chapple's motion to suppress, the officer provided more detail about his 
representation in the warrant application: he clarified that Mr. Chapple had recognized 
Ms. Olsen in a photograph the officer had shown him and had "identif[ied] Jill Olsen by 
name and indicated he knew her face and/or had seen her around." Id. Based on that 
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clarification, the Court of Appeals found that the officer lied in his warrant application: 
from verifying that Olsen was his associate in criminal conduct, Chapple's 
statements to Officer Morgan indicates that Olsen was, at most, a passing 
acquaintance." Id. 
That false representation - that Mr. Chapple was associated with Ms. Olsen -
established the connection between Mr. Chapple and Ms. Olsen's drug trafficking 
operation. Therefore, the whole representation was tainted and had to be set aside. 
As a result, the Court of Appeals "remove[d the officer's] statement about Chapp/e's 
connection to Olsen from the evidence submitted to obtain the search warrant." 
Id. (emphasis added). Without those statements, "the evidence of probable cause [falls] 
like a house of cards .... [T]here is nothing to tie Chapple to Olsen's drug-related 
activities."9 Id. 
9 In other cases, where the officer's misstatement only spoke to a specific fact about, for 
example, the place to be searched or the items being sought, the Court of Appeals has 
set aside only the specific portion of the statement which was erroneous. Thus, when 
an officer testified that the truck he sought to search was "maroon," even though the 
victim had told him it was "brown," the Court of Appeals removed the term "maroon" 
from the affidavit, but considered the remainder of the officer's testimony about the truck 
in its probable cause determination. State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 512-13 (Ct. App. 
1996). Similarly, when the officer included various items being sought in his affidavit 
even though those items had already been recovered, the warrant was still appropriate. 
State v. Thompson, 121 Idaho 638, 641 (Ct. App. 1992). The Thompson Court implied 
that, even if the improperly-listed items were removed from the application, there would 
still be probable cause for the warrant to issue because there were other items listed in 
the warrant which were still missing. Id. 
However, unlike in Chapple, the misstatements in Kay and Thompson did not 
mislead the magistrate as to how the officer was aware of the fact or mislead the 
magistrate in such a way as would manipulate the inferences the magistrate would draw 
about the connection between the suspect and the place to be searched and/or the 
items sought. See Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530; cf. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 
(2004) (indicating that those sort of connections are what establish probable cause). 
Therefore, the more narrow strikes were appropriate in those cases. However, in 
Chapple, the Court of Appeals did not just strike the representation that Mr. Chapple 
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In this case, as in Chapple, Officer Fisher's false representations established the 
connection between Mr. Rozajewski and the items sought in his room, manipulating the 
inferences the magistrate would draw about those items - notably, whose they were, 
and thus, who knew that they were in the room. In fact, this was the district court's 
expressed concern with the officer's lie. (R., pp.81-82.) As a result, all Officer Fisher's 
erroneous representations regarding Ms. Lee's statements should have been set aside. 
Thus, the district court's reliance on part of Officer Fisher's false representation - that 
there was methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room (R., p.83) [because Ms. Lee had 
seen it there] - was erroneous. 
b. The District Court Improperly Considered The Evidence The Officer 
Might Have, But Did Not Actually, Provide To The Magistrate 
The other reason the district court erroneously considered the fact that Ms. Lee 
told officers there was methamphetamine in a backpack in Mr. Rozajewski's room was 
that it was "including exculpatory information about the location of the 
methamphetamine" in its consideration of whether there was still sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause for the warrant. (R., p.82.) However, Officer Fisher did not 
testify as to where in the room Ms. Lee said the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia 
supposedly were. (See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) He certainly 
did not say anything about a backpack. 10 (See generally Audio of Warrant Application 
was an associate of Ms. Olsen's and still consider the fact that he actually did know her 
because the taint of the false representation would still be impacting the analysis. See 
Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530. Thus, it struck more broadly and removed the entire 
statement "about Chapple's connection to Olsen." Id. 
10 As will be discussed in depth in Section 11(8), infra, the absence of testimony about 
the backpack during the warrant application hearing also means the district court's 
29 
Hearing.) Considering facts that the officer might have, but did not, present to the 
magistrate exceeds the scope of review permitted once a defendant has met his initial 
burden under Franks. 
The proper procedure under Franks provides: "If the defendant established 
perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence, and 'with the 
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the 
search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the 
affidavit."' Ledbetter, 118 Idaho at 11 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156) (emphasis 
added). As the Court of Appeals has explained, this means that "the false testimony 
simply must be set aside and a determination then made as to whether there remains 
sufficient content in the sworn testimony before the magistrate to support a finding of 
probable cause." State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 822 (Ct. App. 1984), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
district court cannot properly consider facts which were not included in the remainder of 
the officer's sworn testimony to the magistrate when evaluating whether probable cause 
remained after it has set aside the officer's affirmative misstatements. 11 
As a result, the district court in this case improperly included the "information 
about the location of the methamphetamine" - specifically, that it was in a backpack in 
conclusion that this information was, in fact, known to the magistrate is clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. 
11 The rule is different if the misstatement is an omission of fact. In that scenario, the 
district court adds the omitted fact in to the calculus to see if the probable cause 
determination would change had that fact been presented. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 
156; Sorbet, 124 Idaho at 279. However, since the district court only found affirmative 
misrepresentations (see R., pp.80-81), the omission rule is inapplicable to this issue. 
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Mr. Rozajewski's room - in its probable cause analysis because those facts were not 
part of the remaining sworn testimony once the false testimony about Ms. Lee's 
statement was set aside. 
This is problematic in this case because what Ms. Lee actually told Officer 
Hemmert was "she had a loaded methamphetamine pipe in her backpack in the 
Defendant's room." {R., p.81 (emphasis added).) Thus, the scope of the warrant was 
drastically affected by Officer Fisher's misrepresentation of fact because it allowed the 
officers to search not just for Ms. Lee's backpack, which contained the proper target of 
the search, but the whole of Mr. Rozajewski's room for methamphetamine. (See Audio 
of Warrant Application Hearing, 7:19-7:41 (articulating the scope of the warrant).) This 
allowed the officers to search far more of the room to try and locate methamphetamine 
in numerous other places than just Ms. Lee's backpack. Cf State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 
985, 989 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the particularity requirement of the warrant 
requirement). However, given the statement Ms. Lee actually gave, the scope of the 
warrant would have properly been limited to Ms. Lee's backpack, and so, limited the 
intrusiveness of the intrusion into Mr. Rozajewski's privacy. 
8. The District Court Made Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings About What Facts 
Had Been Presented To The Magistrate 
The district court's evaluation of whether probable cause existed after Officer 
Fisher's false representations had been set aside is also wrong because it is based on 
the clearly erroneous finding that "[t]he information known to the magistrate was that the 
officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a tin containing 
marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of the [sic] Delisle 
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and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's room." (R., pp.82-
As that factual finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, this 
Court should set that clearly erroneous finding aside. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 
Idaho 655, 659 (2007). 
The problem with this factual finding is not that the individual facts are 
inconsistent with the record on appeal, but rather, that the evidence does not support 
the district court's overarching conclusion that the magistrate was aware of those 
particular facts. Those specific facts, detailing the nature of the drug paraphernalia and 
where those items were found, came out only during the officers' testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress held in the district court. (See, e.g., Tr., p.13, 
L.24 - p.14, L.4.) Those facts were not presented to the magistrate during the warrant 
application hearing. (See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) The 
recording of the warrant application hearing is dispositive as to what information was 
before the magistrate, and it directly contradicts the district court's factual finding in this 
regard. 
The first clearly erroneous aspect of the district court's description of what the 
magistrate knew dealt with the nature of the items found prior to the application for a 
warrant. For example, the district court concluded that the magistrate was aware that 
there was "a tin containing marijuana." (R., p.83 (emphasis added).) That is a clearly 
erroneous determination because Officer Fisher made no representation about the 
contents of the tin at the warrant application hearing; all he said was that "[d]rug 
paraphernalia consisted of a marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a methamphetamine 
pipe .... " (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00 (emphasis added).) In fact, 
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Officer Fisher described all those items as "paraphernalia." (See Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 1 :45-2.00.) Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the 
magistrate knew about the contents of the tin was clearly erroneous and should be set 
aside. 
The second clearly erroneous aspect of the district court's finding addresses the 
location those items were found. The district court found that, "[t]he information known 
to the magistrate was that the officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the 
living room, a tin containing marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the 
bedroom of the [sic] Delisle and Lechner .... " (R., pp.82-83 (emphasis added).) 
However, at no time during that hearing did Officer Fisher testify that this drug 
paraphernalia had been found in any particular room. (See generally Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing.) He only testified that, "[u]pon entering [the house], they [the other 
officers] found drug paraphernalia in plain view. Drug paraphernalia consisted of a 
marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a methamphetamine pipe ..... [I believed there 
were drugs in Mr. Rozajewski's room d]ue to all the drugs found in the residence in the 
common area .... " (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00, 6:36-6:54 
(emphasis added).) The closest Officer Fisher got to specifically stating where those 
items had been found was his testimony that he had seen these items "in the front living 
area as soon as you walked in the front door." 12 (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
12 The testimony at the motion to suppress hearing indicates that the other officers had 
gathered that evidence together before Officer Fisher arrived. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, 
L.4 (Officer Hemmert's testimony about finding the items in the common room); 
Tr., p.20, Ls.19-21 (Officer Fisher testifying that, when he arrived on scene, Officer 
Hemmert briefed him on what he had found while searching the house).) However, no 
such representation was made to the magistrate judge. (See generally Audio of the 
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2:32-2:46 (emphasis added).) Therefore, the district court's findings that the magistrate 
was aware of where the drug paraphernalia had been found by the other officers were 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. As a result, this Court should set 
those clearly erroneous findings aside as well. 
In that same regard, the district court's conclusion that the magistrate knew the 
drug paraphernalia had been found in backpacks was clearly erroneous. Specifically, 
the district court found that, "[t]he information known to the magistrate was that the 
officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a tin containing 
marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of the [sic] Delisle 
and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's room." (R., pp.82-83 
(emphasis added).) Officer Fisher never mentioned any backpacks in his testimony to 
the magistrate at the warrant application hearing. (See generally Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing.) In fact, Officer Fisher testified to the magistrate that the drug 
paraphernalia was found in the common area was in "plain view." (Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00.) It is hard to reconcile how this drug paraphernalia 
could be in a backpack, and yet also be in plain view. Therefore, the district court's 
Warrant Application Hearing.) Officer Fisher just said he had seen those items in the 
front living area: 
Q. Did you see the -- you said meth paraphernalia? 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay. And where was that? 
A. It was in the front living area as soon as you walked in the front door. 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:32-2:46 (emphasis added).) 
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conclusion that the magistrate was aware that the drug paraphernalia was in backpacks 
is clearly erroneous in light of the audio recording of the warrant application hearing. It, 
along with all the other clearly erroneous findings the district court made in this regard, 
should be set aside. 
Allowing these clearly erroneous factual determinations to remain in the record is 
particularly problematic in this case because the district court had to determine whether, 
based on the information actually presented to the magistrate, probable cause was still 
established. See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. 156; Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530. However, 
those clearly erroneous descriptions of the location and nature of the drug 
paraphernalia found in the common area of the house were an integral part of the 
district court's analysis on that issue. (R., pp.82-83.) Therefore, the presence of those 
clearly erroneous factual findings actually further demonstrates why this Court should 
reverse the order denying the motion to suppress based on the district court's failure to 
properly apply the Franks standard. 
C. Considering Only The Evidence That Was Truthfully Presented To The 
Magistrate, There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish Probable Cause To 
Search Mr. Rozajewski's Room 
Once Officer Fisher's false representations are properly set aside, as are all the 
clearly erroneous factual findings about what facts were before the magistrate, the only 
evidence remaining in Officer Fisher's sworn testimony at the warrant application 
hearing upon which probable cause might be based was that drug paraphernalia had 
been "found in the common area of the house." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
6:36-6:54; see generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) That evidence is not 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search Mr. Rozajewski's room. 
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In order to establish probable cause, the State must show "a nexus between 
criminal activity and the item to be seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized 
and the place to be searched. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2003). That nexus 
must be "established by specific facts; an officer's general conclusions are not enough." 
Id. To establish that nexus, "there must be some facts, in addition to the finding of 
probable cause that the person has committed a crime, which would support a finding 
that there is a fair probability that the items sought are in the location which the officers 
seek to search," though magistrates may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
in this regard. State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 644 (Ct. App. 1993). 
As discussed in depth in Section l(B), supra, once the false representations in 
this case are set aside, there are no specific facts actually presented to the magistrate 
that created a nexus between Mr. Rozajewski's room and the items in the common 
room. Rather, the only thing presented at the warrant application hearing speaking to 
any sort of connection between the items to be seized and Mr. Rozajewski or his room 
was Officer Fisher's general conclusion that, because there were drugs in the common 
area, there must also be drugs in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (See Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) However, "an officer's general conclusions are not 
enough" to establish probable cause. Yager, 139 Idaho at 686. Therefore, the State 
failed to meet its burden to prove the nexus to establish probable cause to invade 
Mr. Rozajewski's privacy by searching the room over which only he had control. 
Compare State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 347 (2011 ). 
Since there was not probable cause, "the search warrant must be voided and the 
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the 
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face of the affidavit." Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. This means that all the evidence found 
in Mr. Rozajewski's room during the search under the warrant needed to be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rozajewski respectfully requests this Court grant review in this case. On 
review, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse 
the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of October, 2015. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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